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Journal Price Escalation and 
the Market for Information: 
The Librarians' Solution 
Bruce R. Kingma and Philip B. Eppard 
This article analyzes the problem of journal price escalation as one of equi-
librium between two connected segments of the market for information: the 
library market and the market for individual subscriptions. The relationship 
between these two segments has been critically affected by the ready availability 
of cheap, high-quality photocopying, which has encouraged individuals to rely 
more on libraries' subscriptions to meet their information needs. The economic 
theories of F. P. Ramsey show that society is better-off if the costs of journals are 
shared by both market segments. The proposed solution is for libraries to restrict 
journal use to within the library and to price photocopies optimally in order to 
encourage an increase in private subscriptions. 
• 
he rising prices of journal sub-
scriptions have been a continu-
ing topic of interest and lament 
for librarians and others for 
well over a decade. In stringent fiscal times 
the problem seems more pressing than 
ever, and yet no effective solution has 
emerged from the numerous attempts to 
analyze the problem. Several authors in 
information science and economics have 
evaluated the problem of journal price 
escalation. Richard M. Dougherty and 
Brenda L. Johnson, among others, have 
attributed journal price escalation 
simply to overly greedy publishers seek-
ing to extract ever greater profit from 
libraries.1 Malcolm Getz and David W. 
Lewis, among others, have suggested 
that high subscription prices are neces-
sary in order for publishers to survive, 
given the unique downward-sloping 
average cost curves that publishers face.2 
Yoram Barzel and Janusz Ordover and 
Robert D. Willig have accurately de-
scribed the market for journals as an equi-
librium between the two connected 
segments of the market for information, 
namely, the library market and the market 
for personal subscriptions.3 J~mes Talaga 
and Jean Walstrom Haley have outlined 
the various reasons why publishers 
charge higher subscription rates to li-
braries than they do to individuals.• 
While these explanations have a place 
in describing the price that libraries are 
charged for journal subscriptions, they 
do not fully explain what has changed in 
the market to cause the dramatic price 
escalation of the past thirty years. Only 
S. J. Liebowitz has identified the increase 
in library subscription rates as the result 
of the increasing quality and decreasing 
real price of photocopying. 5 However, he 
failed to examine the economic welfare 
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implications of the two market segments, 
to explain the cost structure of the industry, 
or to offer any solutions to librarians. In 
addition, Liebowitz, Barzel, and Ordover 
and Willig are largely theoretical in their 
analyses and fail to offer any practical 
solutions useful to librarians. 
Articles in library and information 
science journals have focused on the 
' decreasing average cost curves-or high 
first-copy costs-of journal publishers 
and the segmentation of the market for 
journals into private and institutional 
subscriptions. The high cost of setting up 
the first copy of a journal implies that 
publishers must charge a price above the 
cost of subsequent copies in order tore-
coup their initial expense. The segmen-
tation of the market into institutional 
and private subscriptions allows pub-
lishers to charge separate prices to each 
part of the market. Libraries, which will 
normally pay more than individuals for 
a journal before canceling their subscrip-
tions, are charged a higher price. 
However, while these authors may be 
correct in assuming that journal publish-
ers face downward sloping average cost 
curves, these economic facts of life for 
publishers need not necessarily imply 
higher journal prices for libraries. In par-
ticular, their hypothesis fails to explain 
why publishers could survive thirty years 
ago but now must charge prices signifi-
cantly higher in real terms. 
The unwillingness of libraries to can-
cel journal subscriptions when prices in-
crease (what is termed in economics the 
inelastic demand of the library market) 
and the fact that the market for library 
subscriptions can be segmented from 
that for personal subscriptions enable 
journal publishers to charge a price for 
libraries that is above their marginal 
cost. However, this explanation ignores 
the causes of inelastic library demand, 
the nature of publishers' costs, and, more 
importantly, the connection between the 
library demand for journals and the 
demand for personal subscriptions.6 
Understanding the economics of in-
formation markets is critical to under-
standing the problem of journal price 
escalation. The problem cannot be an-
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swered by solely looking at the demand 
and supply of journals to libraries. The 
problem is one of market equilibriums 
not only in the library market but also in 
the market for private subscriptions and 
in the important relationship between 
these markets. Academic library demand 
for journal subscriptions is (or should be) 
directly related to the desires of the fa-
culty and students that the library 
serves. Individual demand for journals 
is related to the benefit and cost of a 
journal subscription and the benefit and 
cost of the next best alternative, i.e., 
using the library's subscription. It is the 
relationship between these two parts of 
the market for journals that is critical to 
understanding the price of journals and 
the solution to the problem. 
COMMON MISUNDERSTANDINGS . 
AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 
Several common misunderstandings 
exist in the debate over journal pricing. 
The first misunderstanding is that the 
sole reason that publishers charge 
higher prices to libraries is because 
librarians are unwilling to cancel sub-
scriptions when prices increase. Michael 
E. D. Koenig (1984)/ Lewis, and Getz, 
among others, have corrected this fal-
lacy. The publisher's profit-maximizing 
price is determined by the combination 
of the library's inelastic demand and the 
publisher's marginal cost for journals. 
When contemplating a price increase for 
a journal, publishers compare the esti-
mated percentage decrease in the num-
ber of subscriptions resulting from the 
price increase and the resulting change 
in revenue, with the decrease in costs 
from the decreased number of sub-
scriptions. There will be no incentive to 
increase subscription prices if the price 
increase is so high that too many sub-
scriptions are canceled. The publisher 
will increase price only if it promises 
an increase in profits, or a net gain in 
revenues. 
All producers or firms set prices in 
order to maximize profits. Even non-
profit publishers, faced with competi-
tion from for-profit publishers, may find 
it necessary for survival to charge a price 
that maximizes profit. In a competitive 
market, the market price adjusts in such 
a way that the price charged and the 
level of output sold allow for only cost-
efficient publishers to survive. 
For this same reason, it is unlikely that 
switching to an electronic information 
network will significantly reduce the li-
brary's price of acquiring information. 
Reviewers, referees, and other agents 
who control the process of evaluating 
and disseminating the information may 
still find it impossible to resist the profit 
motive. Individual and institutional 
demand for the information would not 
change, while the cost of providing the 
information in electronic format rather 
than in print would decrease only slightly. 
The resulting market price for library 
access to scholarly information in elec-
tronic media would be reduced only by 
a fraction of the decrease in cost from the 
traditional method of journal publica-
tion. Only a complete usurpation of the 
electronic journal by academic institu-
tions, as suggested by Paul Metz and 
Paul M. Gherman, would dramatically 
alter this situation.8 
A second, more recent misconception 
in the literature on escalating journal 
prices is that the inelastic library 
demand and publishers' costs are the 
principal cause of price escalation over 
the past three decades. While this argu-
ment explains why subscription prices 
are higher for libraries than for in-
dividual subscribers, it does not explain 
the disproportionate increase in library 
subscription prices over the past thirty 
years. 
What has changed is the way in which 
individual subscribers acquire informa-
tion. As noted by Liebowitz, since the 
introduction of the Xerox 914 copier in 
1959, the quality of photocopies has in-
creased. Over this same period, little real 
increase has occurred in the price which 
libraries charge for photocopying. Most 
libraries have increased the price of a 
photocopy from five to ten cents at some 
point in the past ten years. However, the 
consumer price index rose 300 percent 
from 1960 to 1988, implying that the real 
price of a photocopy has decreased. This 
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has resulted in an increased demand for 
photocopies of journal articles, a more 
elastic demand for private journal sub-
scriptions, a more inelastic demand for 
library journal subscriptions, and, ulti-
mately, a dramatic increase in the li-
brary's price of journals. Understanding 
the segmented market for journal demand 
and supply and the connection between 
the two market segments is important to 
understanding fully how photocopying 
prices have influenced the price of jour-
nal subscription. 
SEGMENTED MARKETS: 
JOURNAL DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
Publishers face a market for journal 
subscriptions that is segmented into two 
parts: library subscriptions and individual 
subscriptions. The advantage of having a 
segmented market is that a producer can 
choose his price and level of output in 
each market segment to maximize profit. 
The sum of the profit from each market 
segment will exceed the maximum profit 
available from the market if it cannot be 
segmented. Typically, a producer may be 
able to segment markets by geographic 
location (different countries), consumer 
tastes, or gender. If possible, the pro-
ducer will charge a different price in 
France versus the United States, in the 
city versus the country, to men versus 
women, or to single adults versus fami-
lies or children. 
In many industries with segmented 
markets, the segments are independent 
of one another, meaning that the price 
charged in one market segment has little 
influence over the profitability of the 
other segment. In the journal subscrip-
tions market, the two market segments 
are n9t independent. The availability 
and accessibility of a journal in a library 
directly affect the demand for private 
subscriptions. The price that libraries are 
charged influences the demand for li-
brary subscriptions, and the number of 
library subscriptions sold influences the 
demand for private subscriptions. Like-
wise the expense of a private subscrip-
tion to a journal influences the number of 
academic subscribers. This, in turn, in-
fluences the demands placed on librarians 
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by faculty members and students for the 
library to subscribe to the journal. There-
fore, the price charged for private sub-
scriptions ultimately influences library 
demand. 
The connection between these two 
market segments implies that the price a 
publisher charges in one segment in-
fluences the profitability of the sales in 
the other market segment and vice versa. 
Therefore, in order to understand the 
market for journal publications, it is 
critical to understand the link between 
the two market segments. 
THE MARKET FOR INFORMATION 
The missing key to the evaluation of 
journal prices is a complete understand-
ing of the market for information. The 
market for information connects the two 
segments of the market for journals. In 
the two market segments, neither pub-
lishers' motivations-level of greed-
nor publishers' real costs have changed 
significantly over the past three decades. 
The changes that have occurred have 
been in the market for information. 
Information is the key to any journal 
subscription. Although academic scholars 
may trade information informally, pub-
lication in a refereed journal lends credi-
bility to the research of a particular 
author. This credibility comes from the 
author's articles having passed the 
scrutiny of one or more peer reviewers 
and an editor or editorial committee. The 
peer review system is imperfect, but 
even critics of it such as James M. Banner, 
Jr., and Michael McGiffert recognize it as 
an essential element in scholarly com-
munication.9 The credibility of a journal 
publication is significant enough that 
scholars use it as a measure of the quality 
of the article and as one of the standards 
for making decisions on tenure and pro-
motion. Problems have arisen because of 
the increase in the number of scholarly 
journals that publish many articles never 
cited in later research. These articles 
seem to some people to exist solely for 
the purpose of padding their authors' 
bibliographies in order to secure promo-
tion, tenure, or research grants. 111 It has 
been suggested that academics find an 
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alternative method for tenure evaluation 
in order to reduce library demand for 
journals. If academics were to decrease 
their reliance on publications for tenure, 
these lesser quality journals would no 
longer be necessary. Talaga and Haley 
suggest that the best solution to the jour-
nal price problem may lie in reevaluat-
ing traditional methods of scholarly 
communication. However, it is unlikely · 
that the familiar and relatively efficient 
system of using journal publications for 
evaluating scholarly accomplishments 
and for making decisions on tenure will 
be replaced by a more efficient alterna-
tive. As Charles B. Osburn noted in an 
article reviewing the history of journal 
publication, "Review of the manuscript 
by peers in the field who are qualified to 
judge the significance of the contribution 
has been the basis of the substantive role 
of the journal since its beginnings in the 
seventeenth century.''11 
Scholars have two ways of acquiring 
information from journals: through per-
sonal subscriptions and through library 
subscriptions. The demand for personal 
subscriptions to a journal is a reflection 
of the benefit that individuals receive 
from owning copies of the journal. The 
inelastic library demand for journals is 
(or should be) a reflection in part of the 
demand for information by faculty and 
students who do not have personal 
subscriptions. 
While scholars demand information, 
they also seek to maximize their net per-
sonal benefit from the information. Their 
maximum net personal benefit comes 
from maximizing the difference between 
the benefit of the information and the 
cost of acquiring it. If the benefit of the 
information is the same, regardless of 
the form in which it is received, then 
maximizing net personal benefit is the 
same as minimizing the cost of acquiring 
the information. This process suggests 
that we compare the price of a personal 
subscription to the journal to the cost of 
using the library's subscription. 
Acquiring the information from the 
library's journal subscription only costs 
the time spent in the library. A scholar 
must spend time walking to and from 
the library, but once copied, the article 
can be conveniently read at home or 
in the office. Nearly all faculty members 
have filing cabinets filled with copies of 
journal articles, labeled and alphabe-
tized. Given that the cost of copying a 
few articles from the library's copy of 
the journal is lower than the cost of a 
personal subscription, a faculty mem-
ber minimizes the cost of acquiring 
the information by using the library's 
subscription. 
Of course, some academics may re-
ceive more net benefit from a personal 
subscription to the journal. A bound 
copy is more durable. However, most 
find it more cost effective to use the li-
brary's subscription for all but one or 
two of the most important journals in 
their field. Long runs of journals may 
create an aura of authority in the faculty 
member's office, but shelf space is as 
finite in the office as it is in the library. 
For research purposes, however, a per-
sonal library of copies of journal articles 
may provide more net benefit and be 
more cost effective than a journal sub-
scription. Copies of articles can be sorted 
and cataloged by specialization, author, 
topic, or other method while full issues 
of journals cannot. If extra copies must 
be made for students or others, a photo-
copy of a journal article is easier to du-
plicate than the original journal article. 
In addition, copies of journal articles can 
often be made by graduate students at 
the expense of the department. In this 
way the information can be obtained 
with the minimum possible expenditure 
of time and money. 
Since the introduction of high quality 
photocopiers in 1959, the nominal price 
of a photocopy in most libraries has in-
creased very little. As the quality of copies 
has increased, the real cost to users has 
decreased, and scholars have become 
more reliant on their private libraries of 
photocopied articles rather than on per-
sonal journal subscriptions. Increased 
reliance on photocopies of journal arti-
cles has resulted in a more inelastic 
demand by libraries for journal sub-
scriptions. At the same time, the elasticity 
of demand for private subscriptions has 
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increased, preventing publishers from 
charging private subscribers prices above 
the cost of obtaining a copy from the li-
brary. The availability and quality of pho-
tocopying within the library have given 
scholars a lower cost alternative to ac-
quiring information, requiring the real 
cost of private journal subscriptions to 
decrease and the library demand to be-
come more inelastic. 
Is this the socially optimal way of pro-
viding information to society? Should 
libraries be charged a premium by pub-
lishers to pay for the high fixed costs of 
journal publication while private sub-
scribers are charged the marginal cost of 
printing? According to economic theory 
the answer is no. 
THE ECONOMICS OF 
JOURNAL SUBSCRIPTIONS 
AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
Given the assumption that the high 
fixed or first copy cost of a journal results 
in a downward sloping average cost 
curve, a publisher must charge prices 
above marginal cost in order to avoid 
incurring a financial loss.12 The only 
question that remains relates to the price 
that should be charged in order to max-
imize what economists define as social 
benefit or the net benefit to libraries, 
scholars, and publishers. 
In 1927, the economist F. P. Ramsey 
proved that when prices above marginal 
cost must be charged to cover costs, then 
it is in society's best interests to charge 
above marginal cost prices in all markets. 
In other words, the best interests of 
society are served by the producer re-
covering the high fixed costs of produc-
tion from all markets rather than from 
only one.13 The degree of price difference 
between the socially efficient price and 
the marginal cost depends on the elastic-
ity of demand in each market. 
Economists can analyze the benefit in 
dollar terms by comparing the price a 
consumer is willing to pay for a journal 
subscription with the marginal cost of 
producing it. If someone is willing to pay 
$30 for a subscription which costs $10 to 
produce, the net social benefit is $20. 
This $20 of social benefit will be divided 
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between the consumer and the producer, 
depending on the price charged for the 
subscription. 
Using this definition of social benefit, 
Ramsey's result for optimal journal 
prices is illustrated in figures A-1, A-2, 
B-1, and B-2 and tables 1, 2, and 3 on the 
following pages. Figure A-1 represents 
the market for journal subscriptions by 
libraries. Figure B-1 represents the 
market for journal subscriptions by aca-
demics. The demand in markets A and B 
is represented by Da and Db respec-
tively. Points on Da are shown in table 1, 
columns 1 and 2. Points on Db are shown 
in table 1, columns 3 and 4. Assume that 
the marginal cost (MC in the figures) of 
a journal subscription is $10. Table 1, 
case 1 is illustrated in figures A-1 and 
B-1. In figure A-1, libraries are charged 
$30 per subscription and purchase 350 
subscriptions. In figure B-1, individuals 
are charged $10 per subscription and 
purchase 1,300 subscriptions. 
The shaded area in figure A-1 repre-
sents the benefit lost when people ac-
quire information from the library. This 
loss results from publishers charging 
prices above marginal cost. All subscrip-
tions between Qa=350 and Qe=475 give 
libraries a greater benefit (defined by Da) 
than the cost of producing these addi-
tional subscriptions (defined by MC). 
This result is a straightforward appli-
cation of standard microeconomic theory. 
The marginal benefit of a given subscrip-
tion is the price a consumer (library or 
individual) is willing to pay for it. In 
each market the price a consumer is 
willing to pay for a given subscription is 
represented by the demand curve. The 
net benefit to a consumer of a given sub-
scription is the amount he is willing to 
pay for it minus the price he pays. This 
defines the consumer surplus. In figure 
A-1, a library is willing to pay approxi-
mately $31 for the 349th subscription. If 
the library purchases the 349th subscrip-
tion for $30, its consumer surplus is $1. 
Society (producers plus consumers) fails 
to receive the maximum net social bene-
fit possible when subscriptions valued 
above their marginal cost are not pro-
duced and sold. A social loss, or loss of 
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library consumer surplus, exists in 
market A because the amount libraries 
benefit from subscriptions between Qa 
and Qe is greater than the marginal cost 
of producing these subscriptions. For the 
400th subscription, a library is willing to 
pay approximately $19, a price greater 
than the $10 it costs to print it. However, 
at a price of $30 libraries are prevented 
from purchasing more than 350 sub-
scriptions. 
In case 1, the social loss in the library 
market is the dark shaded area in figure 
A-1. The value of this area is the average 
value of a subscription to libraries that 
cannot afford it times the number of li-
braries· that cannot afford to subscribe 
minus the cost of producing these extra 
subscriptions. This equals: 
0.5 x ($30 + $10) -the average value of a 
subscription to libraries 
without one 
x (475- 350) . -the number of libraries 
which cannot afford a 
subscription 
- $10 x (475 - 350> -the cost of these extra 
subscriptions 
= $1,250 -social loss in the library 
market. 
The value of a subscription to the li-
braries that can afford to subscribe can 
be calculated in a similar way. The value 
to these libraries equals the average 
price they were willing to pay for a sub-
scription times the number of libraries, 
minus the amount they actually paid. In 
case 1, this equals: 
0.5 X ($86 + $30) 
x350 
- $30 X 350 
= $9,800 
-the average value of 
a subscription to librar-
ies with one 
-the number of li-
braries with a subscrip-
tion 
-the amount they 
paid for their subscrip-
tions 
-total benefit to 
libraries with 
subscriptions (table 2, 
case 1, column 10). 
In market B, the market for individual 
subscriptions, publishers charge $10, 
which is equal to the marginal cost of a 
subscription. In market B, all consumers 
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TABLEt 
No. of 
No. of Library Individual 
Quantity of Quantity of Subscriptions Subscriptions 
Library Library Individual Individual Gained Rei. to Lost Rei. to 
Journal Price Subscriptions Journal Price Subscriptions Case 1 Case 1 
(1) (2)' (3) (4)f (5) (6) 
Case 1 $30 350 $10.00 1,300 
Case2 25 381 11.10 1,245 31 (5S) 
Case3 20 413 12.50 1,175 63 (125) 
Case4 15 444 14.50 1,075 94 (225) 
,. Quantity of library subscriptions sold assumes demand for library subscriptions is P = 86- 0.16Q 
t Quantity of individual subscriptions sold assumes demand for individual subscriptions is P = 36- 0.02Q. 
TABLE2 
Total Benefit to Total Benefit to 
Average Value of Average Value of Libraries of Individual of 
a Library an Individual Subscriptions Subscriptions 
Subscription Subscription Publisher Profit (7) X (2) (8) X (4) 
(7)' (S)t (9)* (10) (11) 
Case 1 $28.00 $13.00 $7,000 $9,800 $16,900 
Case2 30.50 12.45 7,085 11,621 15,500 
Case3 33.00 11.75 7,063 13,629 13,806 
Case4 35.50 10.75 7,058 15,762 11,556 
,. The average value of a library subscription is 0.5 (P + $86)- P, where $86 is the highest price a 
library would pay for the subscription and P is the actual price paid. 
t The average value of an individual subscription is 0.5 (P + $36) - P. 
:j: Publisher profit is Q1No. <PIND.- $10) + Qus. (Pus.- $10), where $10 is the cost of a single subscription. 
Case 1 
Case2 
Case3 
Case4 
TABLE3 
Total Benefit to Libraries Plus Individuals 
(10) + (11) 
$26,700 
27,121 
27,435 
27,318 
Total Benefit to Society 
(9) + (10) + (11) 
$33,700 . 
34,206 
34,498 
34,376 
Price 
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who value a subscription above its 
marginal cost can purchase one. There-
fore, no social loss occurs in market B. 
The marginal cost curve represents the 
cost of a given subscription. A producer's 
net revenue from a given subscription is 
the price paid minus marginal cost. In the 
library market, case 1, net producer rev-
enue is equal to 350 x ($30- $10) = $7,000, 
the number of subscriptions sold times 
the profit on each subscription. In the 
market for individual subscriptions, net 
producer revenue is zero. By assumption, 
this net producer revenue from the library 
market is used to cover the high fixed costs 
of producing the journal. 
It is unlikely that switching to an 
electronic information network will 
significantly reduce the library's price 
of acquiring information. 
Table 1, case 3 is illustrated in figures 
A-2 and B-2. In case 3, the library sub-
scription price has been lowered to $20, 
and the individual subscription price has 
been increased to $12.50. In case 3, prices 
are chosen such that net producer revenue 
is virtually unchanged. As a result of the 
lower price, the number of subscriptions 
sold to libraries has increased to 413. The 
added value or consumer surplus gained 
from these additional subscriptions is rep-
resented by the light shaded area in 
figure A-2. From table 2, we can calcu-
late this area which equals $13,629 -
$9800 = $3,829. 
The number of subscriptions sold in 
the individual market segment has 
decreased to 1,175. Academics who can-
cel their subscriptions use the library's 
subscription instead. The social loss in 
the individual market has increased by 
the dark shaded area in figure B-2. This 
lost benefit represents the higher oppor-
tunity cost of using the library journal 
subscription rather than one's personal 
subscription. From table 2, the value of 
subscriptions canceled by academics 
equals $16,900- $13,806 = $3,106. 
Table 3 shows the net gain in benefit to 
libraries and individual subscribers. Note 
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that when we include the publisher's 
profit, which is virtually unchanged, the 
result does not change. Since the gain in 
social welfare in the library market is 
greater than the loss of social welfare in 
the individual subscription market, 
society will, on net, be better off. 
In the market for publishing, social 
loss results from libraries being charged 
a price above marginal cost. If personal 
subscribers are charged the marginal 
cost of a journal copy, no social loss is 
incurred in the personal subscription 
market. However, it would be more 
beneficial for society to have publishers 
charge personal subscribers a price above 
marginal cost, thereby spreading the so-
cial loss over each segment of the market 
and simultaneously minimizing social 
loss. The few private subscribers that 
end their subscriptions because of the 
price increase would use the library's 
subscription. The consumer surplus lost 
by individual subscribers is less than the 
consumer surplus gained by libraries. 
The profit gained by publishers from 
customers who do not cancel their pri-
vate subscriptions could be used to cover 
the publishers' high first copy cost and 
thereby lower the library subscription 
price (figures A-1 and A-2). Socially op-
timal prices would be established when 
the marginal social loss from a price in-
crease in the library subscription market 
equaled the marginal social loss in the 
personal subscription market. According 
to economic theory, not only should librar-
ies be charged a premium, but so should 
private subscribers. Unfortunately, charg-
ing private subscribers a price above 
marginal cost is impossible because their 
alternative is photocopying the library's 
copy of the journal. 
THE SOLUTION 
For librarians, the socially responsible 
solution is to increase the demand for 
private journal subscriptions by increas-
ing the cost of photocopying. This will 
decrease the elasticity of demand for pri-
vate subscriptions. These two factors to-
gether will result in publishers' increasing 
the price above marginal cost to private 
subscribers. Profit that publishers gain 
from the market for private subscrip-
tions might result in publishers' decreas-
ing library subscription prices. The 
change in library subscription prices de-
pends on, among other things, the librar-
ies' elasticity of demand for journal 
subscriptions. However, even if the 
prices of journal subscriptions did not 
decrease, the net cost-the price minus 
the increase in photocopy revenues-to 
the library will decrease.14 
Since the introduction of high quality 
photocopiers the nominal price of a 
photocopy in most libraries has 
increased very little. 
The usual economic suggestion of li-
brary user fees is not a morally ac-
ceptable solution to most librarians. 
However, the librarians' credo of free 
flow of and open access to information 
would seem to imply that access to infor-
mation be free within the confines of the 
library. This does not require that the 
library unwittingly promote a system in 
which academics are free to cancel their 
subscriptions to journals in order to pro-
duce lower cost alternatives for them-
selves. In fact, if higher copying costs do 
induce more individuals to subscribe 
and thereby influence publishers to re-
duce journal subscription prices to li-
braries, then the net effect will be that the 
library has more money to subscribe to 
more journals, thereby enhancing access 
to information. 
The solution is to continue free access 
to information and simultaneously force 
individuals to pay more for their private 
libraries of photocopies by restricting jour-
nal use to within the library and increasing 
photocopying fees. Increasing the cost of 
obtaining a private copy of the informa-
tion from a library will increase the 
demand for personal subscriptions, there-
by making the demand in that market seg-
ment more inelastic. (Admittedly some 
journals are so specialized that few in-
dividuals will be inclined to subscribe to 
them.) These changes in the demand for 
private subscriptions will enable publish-
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ers to increase the price of a private sub-
scription above marginal cost. 
Profit obtained from the market for 
private subscriptions may be used to 
decrease the price of library subscrip-
tions. In addition, library photocopying 
revenues may increase. The net revenue 
gained from a decrease in journal prices 
plus the increase in library photocopy 
revenues can be useq to purchase addi-
tional books or journals. In the end, more 
libraries will be able to subscribe to more 
journals and the number of private sub-
scribers should increase. 15 
The socially optimal price of a photo-
copy is a simple calculation for any 
economist. However, it depends on an 
accurate estimate of the price elasticity 
in each market. Librarians would have 
to estimate the price elasticity of library 
subscriptions, private subscriptions, the 
supply of journals, and photocopying 
along with all of the relevant cross-price 
elasticities. To the best of our knowledge, 
these numbers have never been esti-
mated. In addition, the solution for the 
optimal price of photocopying may not 
yield the socially optimal above marginal 
cost prices for journals. This depends on 
the response of publishers to an increase in 
the demand for private subscriptions. 
There are some practical considera-
tions for a library to take into account 
when setting photocopy prices. Aca-
demic libraries serve students as well as 
faculty, and increased photocopy prices 
may pose a greater burden on students 
than on faculty. They may in fact en-
courage greater mutilation of periodi-
cals in the library. Surveys by Dana 
Weiss and TerriL. Pederson relating to 
theft and mutilation suggest that photo-
copy costs are not really a major factor 
contributing to mutilation, but higher 
costs may change that situation.16 
Another area of concern is potential 
violation of the copyright law provisions 
that permit library photocopying. Ac-
cording to Section 108 of the Copyright Act 
of 1976, the section that elaborates the 
conditions under which libraries and ar-
chives may reproduce copyrighted mate-
rial, such copying is to be done "without any 
purpose of direct or indirect commercial 
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advantage." As James S. Heller has sug-
gested, libraries may run the risk of vi-
olating this provision of the law if their 
photocopying services seem to be gener-
ating a profit.17 But the same section of 
the law relieves a library from liability 
for infringement "for the unsupervised 
use of reproducing equipment located 
on its premises: Provided, That such 
equipment displays a notice that the 
making of a copy may be subject to the 
copyright law." 
Finally, the ethics of access and the 
goodwill and support of the faculty 
should be considered. Increased photo-
copy charges would not, strictly speak-
ing, hinder access to materials. Patrons 
would still have the option of reading 
the journal in the library and taking 
notes, precisely the way research was 
November 1992 
done for generations before the pro-
liferation of cheap photocopying. This 
approach would arguably instill better 
research habits and therefore promote 
better research. Access is diminished 
when journal subscriptions are canceled 
because of rising prices. Faculty no 
doubt would be upset at any steps that 
restrict easy and unlimited photocopy-
ing. But, faced with the only practical 
alternative, canceling subscriptions alto-
gether, faculty members should acqui-
esce to the new costs. What may seem at . 
first a restriction on access would prob-
ably, in the end, promote greater access. 
Not only would subscriptions not have 
to be canceled, but potential additional 
funds from copying fees and/ or reduced 
library subscription rates could allow the 
library to purchase additional materials. 
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